Merz's confrontational course against Russia &the consequences Merz's anti-Russian stance is well known, but the question is how this is perceived in Russia. German, Thomas Röper, reports from Russia.

by Anti-Spiegel (Spiegel is one of the main German political magazines)

4 June 2025, 5:00 a.m.

Every Sunday, I translate the most interesting reports from the weekly news review on Russian television, including reports from the Germany correspondent. These are, of course, intended for a broad audience in Russia, and the correspondent likes to use irony and sarcasm (although, in my opinion, he has almost always been right about the facts), while the correspondents of the Russian news agency use more objective language, as their reports are also aimed at Russian experts and decision-makers.

As an example of this, I have translated an article written by the TASS correspondent in Germany about Chancellor Merz's policy.

Start of translation:

Merz is on a collision course with Russia: what are the consequences of his policy of unconditional support for Kiev?

Vyacheslav Filippov, TASS correspondent in Germany, on what Scholz did not allow himself to do, but which the new German chancellor has taken as his basis.

The new German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has quickly departed from the cautious line taken by his predecessor Olaf Scholz on arms deliveries to Ukraine and has apparently decided to take the lead in Europe in providing military support to Kiev. The leader of the German conservatives began his term with a ‘diplomatic offensive,’ travelling to Paris, Warsaw, Kyiv and Vilnius. According to Der Spiegel, no German head of government has made so many visits immediately after taking office.

Merz is showing great interest in foreign policy issues and has almost made the conflict in Ukraine his personal cause. In conversations with me, experts and politicians describe the chancellor's chosen strategy as risky and do not rule out that he is merely trying to distract attention from the country's domestic problems.

Strategic ambiguity?

Last week, Merz said so much about the conflict in Ukraine that he even put his coalition partner, the SPD, in an awkward position. On 26 May, he said that his country had lifted all restrictions on the range of Ukrainian attacks with German weapons on the territory of the Russian Federation. According to the politician, the same decision had also been taken by the United Kingdom and France. A few days later, during his visit to Finland, the German chancellor claimed that the decision to lift restrictions on the range of weapons systems supplied to Kiev had allegedly been taken ‘several months ago’.

As the Süddeutsche Zeitung noted, this ‘strategic ambiguity’ may be a deliberate decision by Merz, who wants to keep Moscow in the dark about the weapons supplied to Kiev. Previously, after three years of transparency, the German government had decided to keep its military aid to Ukraine secret again. Recently, however, there has been a growing impression that Friedrich Merz is simply unaware of the impact his words as chancellor can have on the world. What he meant by lifting the range restrictions on Western weapons remains unclear to this day.

As a security expert who wishes to remain anonymous told me in conversation, it cannot be ruled out that Merz is preparing the German public for the delivery of Taurus missiles to Kiev, because the German weapons previously delivered to Ukraine do not have the range that would justify lifting restrictions on attacks.

Merz's harsh words towards Russia sometimes sound ill-considered and give the impression that they are only being said to demonstrate the Chancellor's determination to stand up to Russia. Merz has made such statements in the past, for which he later had to justify himself. On one occasion, he referred to young people of Arab origin as ‘little pashas,’ which sparked a wave of outrage. In 2004, during an election campaign event, Merz called for the ‘red mayor’ (a Social Democrat) in his hometown of Brilon to be voted out of office, emphasising that his grandfather had been mayor in the past. However, his grandfather had been a member of the SA reserve and the NSDAP. Shortly before taking office, when discussing possible deliveries of long-range weapons to Kiev, Merz stated on German television that the Crimean bridge could be the intended target of the attacks.

The future chancellor is openly advising the Ukrainian armed forces where to strike? Olaf Scholz would certainly not have allowed himself to do such a thing.

In German diplomatic circles, there is talk that the new chancellor's verbal gaffes are sometimes surprising. A statement Merz made last year on the subject of compulsory military service will be remembered for a long time. He said that ‘you can find peace in every cemetery,’ which shocked the public.

The coalition partner is stunned

Merz's comments on weapons for Kyiv were also met with incomprehension within his own coalition. German Vice-Chancellor and Finance Minister Lars Klingbeil (SPD) told journalists that no new agreements had been made on limiting the range of Ukrainian attacks on Russian territory with German weapons. SPD member of the Bundestag Ralf Stegner even openly criticised Merz, noting that such statements were ‘not helpful.’

SPD defence expert Falco Droßmann told the newspaper taz that the Social Democrats were demanding additional information following Merz's comments: "Above all, those members of the parliamentary group who are less familiar with military policy are asking: 'Hey, what does Merz mean by that? Droßmann also noted that it was unclear why the chancellor kept talking about ‘long-range fire.’ According to the MP, such weapons are normally understood to be weapon systems with a range of 3,000 to 5,000 kilometres. Even Taurus missiles do not fall into this category. They have a range of about 500 kilometres.

Ulrich Kühn, head of the Arms Control Research Department at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH), believes that Merz's statements are intended to signal to Moscow that Berlin will support Kiev seriously and in the long term. On the other hand, it cannot be ruled out that experts from the German Armed Forces advised him to create a media backdrop that would mitigate the consequences of supplying Taurus missiles to Kiev.

The SPD has been and remains cautious on the issue of military aid to Ukraine, despite pressure both in the previous (with the Greens and the FDP) and in the current coalition. Those members of the party who call for a return to the policy of détente and disarmament in the spirit of Willy Brandt (Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany from 1969 to 1974), albeit with an eye to the current foreign policy situation, continue to wield considerable influence. Merz's excessive zeal on the issue of arms deliveries to Kyiv and his confrontational course towards Russia are unlikely to contribute to a constructive atmosphere in the German government and could, in the worst case, even split the coalition. The SPD will not blindly follow Merz's line, as this would require the party to abandon its fundamental principles, which would alienate its most loyal supporters. The same applies to the new chancellor's statement that he supports the US proposal to increase NATO countries' military spending to five per cent of their GDP.

The thinking of the 1980s

In foreign policy, Merz thinks in the categories of a Christian Democrat politician of the Bonn Republic of the 1980s. For him, Moscow is the ‘enemy’ and only the preservation of the collective West and the transatlantic partnership can stop this ‘threat,’ in his opinion. Almost 35 years after the end of the Cold War, the Americans are gradually moving away from the East-West divide and recognising that the world is changing and that geopolitical shifts are taking place. Where will Merz's conservative foreign policy thinking take him in the 21st century without the involvement of the US?

As leader of the opposition, Merz constantly criticised Scholz for what he considered insufficient support for Kyiv, especially on the issue of arms deliveries, for lack of coordination with allies, and said that Ukraine was being forced to fight ‘with one hand behind its back,’ demanded the use of Taurus long-range missiles and issued ultimatums to Moscow. After taking office, Merz threatened Russia with new sanctions if it did not participate in the negotiations, but later withdrew these threats because US President Donald Trump wanted to continue the dialogue with Russia.

The issue of Ukraine and building relations with Russia became a litmus test for the new chancellor.

 He has so far been unable to convince countries such as Hungary of the need for a new package of sanctions. Merz is avoiding the issue of supplying Taurus weapons to Kiev as much as possible, and a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin is apparently not yet on the agenda. The Chancellor is trying to achieve transatlantic unity in the conflict with Russia and in support of the Kiev regime.

 There has been frantic diplomatic activity, a trip to Kiev with Emmanuel Macron, Donald Tusk and Keir Starmer, and joint phone calls with Donald Trump. ‘There is agreement in the Chancellery that the Americans must be on their side for the planned European sanctions to impress Putin,’ said an informed source. So far, however, Moscow has repeatedly managed to pull the American president over to its side.

‘The worst-case scenario for Europeans in the Ukraine crisis would be the following: Trump stops arms deliveries to Kiev and lifts sanctions against Russia. Then the transatlantic partnership would essentially be over and Europeans would suffer a crushing foreign policy defeat,’ one of my sources told me.

But can the economy withstand that?

In his first government statement in the Bundestag in mid-May, Merz promised to make the Bundeswehr the strongest conventional army in Europe. ‘This is what our friends and partners expect of us; more than that, they demand it,’ the chancellor emphasised. It is hard to believe that neighbouring countries such as Poland and France, which remember the lessons of history, expect this.

Yet nowhere in the German Basic Law does it say that the Bundeswehr should become the strongest army in Europe in the name of peace, or that the national budget should be militarised, meaning that up to five per cent of GDP should be spent on military purposes. For Germany, this would mean annual defence spending of around 215 billion euros, which is almost half of the total federal budget for 2025. The German constitution only states that the government of the country shall maintain ‘armed forces for the defence’ of the state. The term ‘defence’ has been stretched so far by the federal government that it is no longer clear where its limits lie. The lifting of the debt brake now allows for a significant expansion of the German arms industry's capabilities, which is frightening.

While the pillar of the German economy, the automotive industry, as well as a number of other sectors, is sounding the alarm and announcing ever new cuts, arms companies such as Rheinmetall are reporting profit increases and investing money in new projects. During Vladimir Zelensky's visit to Berlin on 28 May, Merz reported on one of these: Germany and Ukraine have agreed on the purchase of Ukrainian long-range weapon systems. This means that Germany will provide financial support to the Ukrainian arms industry, with no restrictions on the range of these weapons. In Moscow, these plans are seen as nothing less than another provocation of war.

‘Merz wants to show the US that Germany is capable of defending itself and its allies even without its transatlantic partner. However, the new chancellor has chosen a dubious strategy and apparently wants to distract the population from the real problems within Germany,’ an AfD member of parliament told me on condition of anonymity. My interlocutor pointed out that the country is facing recession for the third year in a row and that high energy prices continue to undermine the competitiveness of the German economy. Trump's import tariffs could make an already bleak situation even worse.

According to German observers, investments in the military-industrial complex are not investments that contribute to strengthening social peace in Germany itself, but are essentially ‘dead capital.’ Merz must decide: either he continues to support Kiev unconditionally and strengthens the military potential of the FRG, ultimately risking dragging his country into the conflict, or he makes Germany an economically and socially stable state.

Germans do not want a new Cold War; they want affordable energy, functioning schools and kindergartens, and modern infrastructure. Opinion polls confirm this: the AfD is hot on the heels of the CDU/CSU, and for the first time in almost seven years, the Left Party has overtaken the Greens in the rankings of political forces that consistently advocate tougher sanctions against Russia and more active arms deliveries to Kiev.

End of translation

Merz's confrontational course against Russia and the consequences – Anti-Spiegel

: Anti-Spiegel

Thomas Röper, born in 1971, has held executive and supervisory board positions as an expert on Eastern Europe in financial services companies in Eastern Europe and Russia. Today, he lives in his adopted home of St. Petersburg. He has lived in Russia for over 15 years and speaks fluent Russian. His media-critical work focuses on the (media) image of Russia in Germany, criticism of Western media reporting in general, and (geo)politics and economics.